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Abstract
espite a strong scientific consensus about the existence of anthropogenic climate change,
widespread scepticism in the general population continues to exist. Past research has largely relied
on self-reported behaviours or behavioural intentions when investigating downstream
‘behavioural’ consequences of climate change denial. As a consequence, there remains a large gap
in the literature about how belief in climate change interacts with the pursuit of self-interested,
environmentally harmful behaviours. To fill that gap, the present research uses a novel,
experimental economic paradigm that allows to attach true environmental consequences to
laboratory decisions. Based on∼56 000 pollution decisions from 2273 participants in more than 30
countries, we find that belief in climate change meaningfully affects decision-making. Our results
show that climate change scepticism predicts self-interested choices and showcases that sceptics
have an insensitive acceptance of emissions, reaping benefits no matter how large the climate cost
are or how small the personal benefits become. Therefore, our results critically augment
meta-analytic evidence arguing that downstream behavioural consequences are small to medium
in their effect size. We discuss the use of experimental economic paradigms as a crucial innovation
tool for psychological research addressing people’s willingness to engage in climate action.
1. Introduction
Anthropogenic climate change has large, irreversible,
and detrimental effects on humanity as well as on
global ecosystems, making environmental sustainab-
ility our most pressing social, cultural, and policy
challenge. Experts have established an overwhelming
consensus about the rapid need to transform nearly
all aspects of our economy, including the energy sec-
tor, the transportation sector, or the global food sys-
tems, in an effort to achieve a fundamental reduction
of greenhouse gases (Hough-Guldberg et al 2018).
Individual consumption significantly contributes to
the total emissions (Ivanova et al 2016) and, as a
result, experts call for an increased focus on indi-
viduals and their decision-making (Ethics Commis-
sion for a Safe Energy Supply 2011, Acatech et al
2017). Although successful climate changemitigation
will involve political regulation in order to secure
global cooperation (e.g. price or quantity regulation
of emissions), how people respond to these incentives
requires an accurate understanding of human beliefs
and behaviours that alleviate or exacerbate emission
levels (Creutzig et al 2016, Kaiser et al 2020). This res-
ults in an important role of psychological research in
our mitigation efforts (Clayton et al 2015, Lange et al
2018).
Although intentions and behaviours are not
always and fully in line with each other, many
people in principle agree that climate change is
real, dangerous, and that we have a moral oblig-
ation to combat the adverse effects thereof. Yet,
a significant share of the population remains
doubtful about the existence and anthropogenic
origin of climate change. This share remains
rather large and ranges between 35% and 46%
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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depending on the study (Anderegg et al 2010,
Hall et al 2018).
It is therefore not surprising that the environ-
mental social sciences and closely related disciplines
have developed a distinct research interest in the
causes and consequences of belief (and disbelief) in
climate change. Hornsey et al (2016) conducted a
large meta-analysis synthesizing the existing body
of work. The most important results address ante-
cedents of climate change belief, finding that tradi-
tional societal fault lines, among them gender, age,
race, or income, seem only loosely connected to belief
in climate change. In a similar vein, meta-analytical
results suggest only a modest association of variables
such as education, knowledge, or experience with
(extreme) weather events and climate change beliefs.
Antecedents with more predictive power are typically
rooted in values, ideologies, or preferences for system
justification (Hornsey et al 2016).
Next to the causes of climate change scepticism,
the downstream consequences have similarly been
addressed in previous research, also summarized in
the extensive meta-study by Hornsey et al (2016).
The body of research on downstream consequences is
largely motivated by the fact that climate scepticism
is regarded a prime inhibitor of pro-environmental
behaviour and other collective climate action, there-
fore threatening successful mitigation efforts (Gifford
2011). As our mitigation efforts are urgent and
require large-scale consensus about our joint need
to act, an exact understanding of the behavioural
consequences of climate scepticism is a paramount
research task.
Surprisingly, the consequences of climate change
scepticism in terms of actual decision-making remain
largely unknown. This results from the fact that the
research efforts on the downstream consequences of
climate scepticism have almost exclusively relied on
self-reports of behaviour or on intentions to engage
in pro-environmental behaviours3. This seems partly
driven by a lack of consequential behavioural tasks
(Lange and Dewitte 2019). To illustrate, out of 196
studies investigated in the meta-analysis (Hornsey
et al 2016), merely one investigated actual behaviour
and none focused on controlled behaviour under
varying incentives. This opens the door for poten-
tial measurement bias (e.g. social desirability, recall
inaccuracy; Lange et al 2018, Lange and Dewitte
2019) and largely ignores the well-documented phe-
nomenon that attitudes do not fully and accur-
ately translate into behaviour, referred to as the
environmental attitude-behaviour gap (Kollmuss and
Agyeman 2002).
3 We acknowledge that research on pro-environmental behaviour
has to a certain extent relied on actual behaviours (see Lange and
Dewitte 2019 for a review).However, to our knowledge, this has not
been the case with regard to downstream consequences of belief in
climate change.
Thus, a large open spot in the research land-
scape persists, namely the investigation in how far
deniers of versus believers in climate change are
actually willing to internalize carbon-related extern-
alities. The present research taps into that blank-
spot and employs a novel behavioural task with
actual environmental consequences coined the car-
bon emission task (CET, Berger and Wyss 2021).
Because the task uses a within-participants experi-
mental manipulation of the personal and environ-
mental consequences, we can observe to what degree
people high versus low in belief in climate change
are willing to internalize the associated climate costs
of reaping personal benefits. We test if people who
deny climate change are largely insensitive to the
environmental harm caused by their action, meaning
that people who believe in climate change take into
account higher carbon cost and lower personal gains
and respond with a higher propensity to engage in
pro-environmental behaviour. In addition, we expect
belief in climate change to correlate positively with
average pro-environmental behaviour.
2. Methods
2.1. Open science practices
All materials, data, and code to replicate the stat-
istical analyses are available on the Open Science
Framework (osf.io/h2r5e).We confirm that we report
all experimental conditions (i.e. these are uniquely
within participants variations). All data exclusions
follow the pre-registered protocol established in Ber-
ger and Wyss (2021).
We disclose below howwe determined our sample
size, including a power sensitivity analysis showing
that the smallest detectable effect is smaller than the
reported average effect in the meta-study by Horn-
sey et al (2016). For the present research, we col-
lapsed all data we possess as of October 2020 that
included the CET with identical payoffs, without
an experimental manipulation preceding the assess-
ment of behaviour, and for which we have a meas-
urement of individual differences in belief in cli-
mate change. The final sample resulted in eight single
experimental sessions involving a total of n = 2273
participants. The descriptive statistics for each ses-
sion can be found in the supplementary mater-
ial (available online at stacks.iop.org/ERL/16/074018/
mmedia). Study instructions were identical for each
session. All participants were recruited through
Amazon Mechanical Turk or Prolific.ac. To account
for between-session heterogeneity, the respective ses-
sion was included as a fixed effect in all statistical
models.
2.2. Sample size determination and participants
Our study is grounded on a high-powered sample
with data from 2273 participants (42% female,
Mage = 35 years, ranging from 18 to 79 years),
2
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Figure 1. Illustration of the carbon emission task (sample decision).
involving roughly 56 000 decisions. The sampling
decision followed budgetary constraints (Lakens
2021). As the meta-study published by Hornsey
et al (2016) offers a good estimate of expected effect
sizes—although these are grounded in self-reported
behaviours rather than actual behaviour—we can
compare our minimum detectable effect to the pub-
lished average effect size of the correlation of cli-
mate change beliefs and self-reported behaviour. As
our sample yields a minimum detectable effect of
ρ = 0.07 based on an alpha error of 5% and high
power of 95%, our study is sufficiently powered to
detect a substantially smaller effect than in the meta-
study. The 95% CI for the effect of climate change
belief on private pro-environmental behaviour is
around 0.28–0.35 per visual inspection (see figure
3 in Hornsey et al 2016). For each analysis, we used
the maximum possible number of participants (i.e.
implying that sample sizes vary between distinctive
analyses). Throughout the data reported here, parti-
cipants received a flat compensation plus the varying
amount depending on their decisions in the CET.Our
study received ethical approval and was conducted in
line with the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants
gave written informed consent prior to the study.
2.3. The carbon emission task
The CET is a validated behavioural experimental
paradigm to measure consequential environmental
behaviours, which has shown good internal con-
sistency and construct validity (Berger and Wyss
2021). It taps into the individual trade-off between
personal short-term gains and long-term envir-
onmental goals, therefore directly pitching fin-
ancial rewards against people’s motive to avoid
carbon emissions. In the task, people are con-
fronted with a series of decisions about choos-
ing a financially rewarding Option A and a finan-
cially non-rewarding, but carbon-neutral Option B
(see figure 1).
Potential bonus levels and carbon consequences
are fully crossed and randomly presented to decision-
makers. The level of rewards were 0.20, 0.40, 0.60,
0.80, or 1.00 USD (Amazon Mechanical Turk) or
GBP (Prolific.ac), the level of carbon emissions were
0, 0.23, 1.02, 4.46, or 19.85 lbs CO2. Participants
received a lump sum payment for participation and
the opportunity of an additional bonus, depending
on their decisions. One trial is randomly selected for
payoff, a method referred to as the ‘pay one’ method
in experimental economics (Charness et al 2016).
Crucially, the environmental externality attached to
choices of Option A is realized through the pur-
chase and retirement of emission certificates through
the European Emission Trading System (see Berger
andWyss 2021, for details). Experimental economists
increasingly use this method to attach actual envir-
onmental consequences to laboratory behaviour (e.g.
Tavoni et al 2011).
2.4. Self-report measures
In addition to the CET, participants completed self-
report measures in the same fixed order. As the
key interest of this paper, we had participants com-
plete a three-item scale assessing ‘Belief in Climate
Change’ (adapted from Heath and Gifford 2006,
Cronbach’s alpha >.73 for each individual session,
see supplementary material). Particularly, we used
three items tapping into the occurrence, causes,
and consequences of global climate change. The
items were ‘Global warming is occurring now’, ‘The
main cause of global warming are human activities’,
and ‘Global warming will bring about some serious
negative consequences’. Furthermore, we assessed a
self-report measure of pro-environmental attitudes
through the New-Environmental-Paradigm Scale-
Revised (Dunlap et al 2000, Cronbach’s alpha >.76 for
each individual session, see supplementary material).
Participants answered items on both of these con-
structs using five-point scales ranging from ‘strongly
disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. We formed composite
measures for these two scales, as the underlying con-
structs are unidimensional. In addition, we collec-
ted various demographic variables, among them age,
gender, education, income, religiousness, and polit-
ical orientation on the liberal/conservative spectrum.
3
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Table 1. Results from mixed-effects logistic regressions with session fixed effects used to estimate marginal effects plotted in figure 2
(panel A) and control models.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Predictors OR CI p OR CI p OR CI p
(Intercept) 0.08 0.05–0.11 <.001 0.05 0.03–0.08 <.001 0.05 0.03–0.10 <.001
Belief in climate change 1.56 1.36–1.78 <.001 1.56 1.36–1.78 <.001 1.38 1.16–1.64 <.001
Carbon emission 1.12 1.11–1.12 <.001 1.12 1.11–1.12 <.001 1.12 1.11–1.12 <.001
Belief in climate
change× carbon emission
1.03 1.03–1.03 <.001 1.03 1.03–1.03 <.001 1.03 1.03–1.04 <.001
Gender (1 if female) — — — 1.43 1.15–1.77 .001 1.32 1.05–1.65 .018
Political ideology — — — — — — 0.97 0.91–1.04 .392
Environmental attitudes — — — — — — 1.18 0.95–1.47 .134
Income FE — No — — Yes — — Yes —
Session FE — Yes — — Yes — — Yes —
Random effects
σ2 3.29 3.29 3.29
τ 00 5.92 participant 5.82 participant 5.85 participant
ICC 0.64 0.64 0.64
N 2266 participants 2263 participants 2133 participants
Observations 56 246 56 171 52 937
Marg. R2/Cond. R2 0.177/0.706 0.184/0.706 0.180/0.705
Note: differences in sample size occur due to missing values.
Finally, additional self-reported scales that were not
part of the present research question were gathered in
some of the sessions. The entire materials are presen-
ted in the supplementary material.
2.5. Procedure
After giving informed consent, participants first com-
pleted the 25 trials of the CET in randomized order.
Each participant provided his or her answer within a
time limit of 15 s. The time limit was introduced in
order to assure a similar duration for each participant
in the task. That said, this timing constraint did not
restrict any participants. After completion of the CET,
participants provided answers to the self-report scales
as well as the demographic questions. Finally, par-
ticipants were thanked and received the notification
that their payment would be processed through the
platforms (Amazon Mechanical Turk or Prolific.ac).
3. Results
3.1. Diminished sensitivity of climate change
deniers
The results show strong behavioural differences in
line with the hypothesis. The more sceptic people
are, the less they take into account the environmental
externality associated with their choices, and the less
sensitive they are to the prospective bonus payments.
In contrast, people who believe in climate change are
highly reactive to incentives and forego the oppor-
tunity to gain financially when the environmental
cost are high or when the bonus is low. Thus, the
results show that deniers of anthropogenic climate
change seize to reap the financial bonus, no matter
how small the personal benefits are or how large the
environmental consequences become. Tables 1 and 2
present regressions showing the interaction of belief
in climate change and the external incentives (table 1:
environmental consequences; table 2: bonus level).
Figure 2 plots the interaction.
3.2. Belief in climate change correlates with
consequential pro-environmental behaviour
Consequently, this diminished sensitivity to per-
sonal and environmental incentives affects the scep-
tics’ overall pro-environmental behaviour. Collapsing
over all decisions, people’s mean emission behaviour
is significantly correlated with their belief in climate
change, both in terms of the number of unsustainable
decisions (rs= .24, 95%CI [.20, .28], p< .001), as well
as with respect to accumulated carbon saved in the 25
choices (rs = .30, 95% CI [.27, .34], p < .001). Table 3
shows that this result is robust to various statistical
controls, among them date and source of data collec-
tion (Model 1), gender, education, income (Model 2),
as well as political ideology and pro-environmental
attitudes (Model 3).
4. Discussion
Past meta-analytical research on the downstream
behavioural consequences of (dis-)belief in climate
change has concluded that ‘in terms of the con-
sequences, a salient message from the data is that
climate change beliefs have only a modest impact
on the extent to which people are willing to act in
climate-friendly ways’ (Hornsey et al 2016, p 625).
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Table 2. Results from mixed-effects logistic regressions with session fixed effects used to estimate marginal effects plotted in figure 2
(panel B) and control models.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Predictors OR CI p OR CI p OR CI p
(Intercept) 0.39 0.27–0.55 <.001 0.26 0.15–0.42 <.001 0.28 0.16–0.48 <.001
Belief in climate change 1.98 1.74–2.27 <.001 1.99 1.74–2.27 <.001 1.79 1.51–2.12 <.001
Bonus level 0.99 0.98–0.99 <.001 0.99 0.98–0.99 <.001 0.99 0.98–0.99 <.001
Belief in climate
change× bonus level
1.00 1.00–1.00 .007 1.00 1.00–1.00 .007 1.00 1.00–1.00 .008
Gender (1 if female) — — — 1.38 1.14–1.68 .001 1.28 1.04–1.57 .019
Political ideology — — — — — — 0.97 0.91–1.03 .376
Environmental attitudes — — — — — — 1.17 0.96–1.43 .121
Income FE — No — — Yes — — Yes —
Session FE — Yes — — Yes — — Yes —
Random effects
σ2 3.29 3.29 3.29
τ00 4.76 participant 4.69 participant 4.73 participant
ICC 0.59 0.59 0.59
N 2266 participants 2263 participants 2133 participants
Observations 56 246 56 171 52 937
Marg. R2/Cond. R2 0.132/0.645 0.140/0.645 0.137/0.646
Note: differences in sample size occur due to missing values.
Figure 2. Interaction effect between climate change beliefs on the proportion of pro-environmental (i.e. sustainable) choices
conditioned on carbon amounts (panel (A)) and bonus levels (panel (B)).
Table 3. Results from linear regression with mean pro-environmental decisions (i.e. average number of foregone bonus opportunity) as
dependent variable.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Predictors B CI p B CI p B CI p
(Intercept) 0.26 0.22–0.31 <.001 0.19 0.12–0.26 <.001 0.20 0.12–0.27 <.001
Belief in climate
change
0.07 0.06–0.08 <.001 0.07 0.06–0.08 <.001 0.06 0.04–0.08 <.001
Gender (1 if female) — — — 0.06 0.03–0.08 <.001 0.05 0.02–0.07 <.001
Education — — — 0.00 −0.00 to 0.01 .270 0.01 −0.00 to 0.01 .253
Political ideology — — — — — — −0.00 −0.01 to 0.04 .147
Environmental atti-
tudes
— — — — — — 0.02 −0.01 to 0.00 .269
Session (dummy
coded)
— Yes — — Yes — — Yes —
Income category
(dummy coded)
— No — — Yes — — Yes —
Observations 2266 2263 2133
R2/R2 adjusted 0.202/0.199 0.216/0.209 0.212/0.204
Note: differences in sample size occur due to missing values.
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Our research re-assesses this conclusion using a beha-
vioural game attaching actual environmental con-
sequences to laboratory behaviour. In contrast to the
findings based on self-reports, our study shows strong
behavioural effects in a high-powered sample. People
high in scepticism about climate change are largely
unresponsive to the environmental harms attached
to their behaviour, no matter how small the per-
sonal financial benefits are. People who believe in cli-
mate change react to environmental harmswith lower
propensity to accept financial bonuses. This finding
is robust to demographic controls. Our results sug-
gest that the effects particularly emerge under spe-
cific incentives, an effect that is often masked when
using self-reported behaviours that tap into the aver-
age propensity to act pro-environmentally.
Our results further show that climate change
beliefs are weakly correlated with pro-environmental
behaviour when environmental costs are low or per-
sonal benefits are high. Thus, similar to research
on the environmental attitude-behaviour gap (Koll-
muss and Agyemann 2002), we find that belief in
climate change are not always and fully reflected in
pro-environmental behaviour. One reason for this
gap may stem from the lack of cognitive resources,
such as self-control capacity (Langenbach et al 2020,
Nielsen 2017), which refers to people’s ability to align
their behaviour with their long-term goals. Another
potential barrier inhibiting the translation of climate
change beliefs into behaviour may result from pess-
imistic second-order beliefs. Even peoplewho in prin-
ciple belief in anthropogenic climate change may not
act upon their individual belief if they have reasonable
doubt that others join their efforts. Climate change
mitigation, as a global public good, requires collective
action and second-order beliefs may thus undermine
individual willingness to act (Jachimowicz et al 2018,
van der Linden 2021).
Taken together, our results make a conceptual
and methodological contribution to the literature
on downstream, behavioural consequences of climate
scepticism. On the conceptual side, our results call for
a further integration of the full spectrum of the social
sciences. Using behavioural economic paradigms can
be leveraged to study social scientific hypotheses
without using self-reports of behaviours while main-
taining control over decision-making parameters.
Ample evidence showcases that it is not sufficient
to draw conclusion based on hypothetical answers
or self-reported recalls of past behaviour as much
variance remains unexplained (Kormos and Gifford
2014).
On the methodological side, research has thus
far established only a weak link of climate change
denial and behaviour through an excessive reliance
on behavioural intentions or self-reports. Our results
show that within-participant manipulation of per-
sonal benefits and environmental harms can unravel
decision-making patterns that previously remained
hidden, as highlighted by the fact the strongest beha-
vioural difference occurred under strong incentives.
Merely observing average pro-environmental beha-
viour in the CET shows similar effects as presented
in the meta-study (Hornsey et al 2016).
On the practical side of psychological research
on climate change mitigation, our study shows that
simple behavioural games may help to move for-
ward environmental social science, similar to the use
of games in other fields studying social behaviour
(Camerer 2003). However, typical of experimental
tasks (Levitt and List 2007), the CET also provides
first and foremost qualitative insights into the motiv-
ation underlying pro-environmental behaviour. As
other games, it does not necessarily allow accurate
parameter estimates of real-world trade-offs. Never-
theless, the insights derived from experimental games
can substantially contribute to our understanding
of the various motives governing pro-environmental
behaviour.
Finally, understanding the relationship between
climate change beliefs and behaviour may help us to
design optimal policy responses. There is a strong
consensus that climate change mitigation requires
institutions that ‘govern the commons’ and experi-
mental economics has delivered crucial insights into
how beliefs and cooperative behaviour are causally
linked and leveraged by institutions (Ockenfels et al
2020).
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